Before That Artist Came Along, It Was Just a Bridge: The Visual Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site-Specific Artwork by Garson, Francesca
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 11
Issue 1 Fall 2001 Article 4
Before That Artist Came Along, It Was Just a
Bridge: The Visual Artists Rights Act and the
Removal of Site-Specific Artwork
Francesca Garson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Garson, Francesca (2001) "Before That Artist Came Along, It Was Just a Bridge: The Visual Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site-
Specific Artwork," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 11: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol11/iss1/4
BEFORE THAT ARTIST CAME ALONG, IT WAS JUST A
BRIDGE: THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT AND
THE REMOVAL OF SITE-SPECIFIC ARTWORK
Francesca Garsont
INTRODUCTION
John Snyder's sculpture Silent City commands anything but silence.
In fact, from the very day the artist installed the four aluminum tower-
like structures on four separate concrete posts of the Route 96 Bridge in
Ithaca, the public-including the city's mayor-voiced its disapproval
loud and clear.' Snyder's sculptures were called everything from "a jun-
ior high metal shop project to a maximum-security prison for squirrels to
Bart Simpson."'2
On June 7, 2000, exactly seven months after Snyder installed his
work on the bridge, the Ithaca Common Council responded to the pub-
lic's distaste by voting unanimously to remove the artist's structures and
relocate them to a "more suitable location ... within the city. ' 3 The city
contemplated relocating Snyder's structures to a grassy field behind a
local theatre, but the artist protested a move of any kind. Snyder asserted
that the artwork was site-specific and that removal would destroy it.4
Snyder designed the four aluminum structures specifically for the
Route 96 Bridge after winning a competition that the city held as part of
a project to redesign an intersection near the bridge.5 The then-mayor of
Ithaca appointed a jury that selected Snyder's proposal from among fifty-
five entries.6 When the jury announced that Snyder had won the compe-
tition, his drawings and plans were published in a local newspaper and
exhibited in a storefront in downtown Ithaca. Despite the fact that Sny-
der's winning drawings and plans were well-publicized and readily avail-
t J.D., Cornell Law School, 2002; B.A., Vassar College, 1999.
1 See Telephone Interview with John Snyder, Artist, Silent City, in Ithaca, N.Y. (Sept. 1,
2000) [hereinafter Telephone Interview] (noting that the mayor of Ithaca bluntly criticized the
sculptures as being "ugly"); see also Lauren Bishop, Sculptures To Be Removed, ITHACA J.,
June 9, 2000, at IA.
2 Bishop, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 See Telephone Interview, supra note 1.
5 See Lauren Bishop, Octopus Detanglers Angry Over Sculptures, ITHACA J., June 17,
2000, at 2A.
6 See Telephone Interview, supra note I. The jury included a member of the Ithaca city
planning department, an alderperson, two Cornell University architecture professors, and a
local artist. See id.
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able for the local public to see, no one voiced opposition to Snyder's
work until it was actually constructed and installed on the Route 96
Bridge.7
The problem that Snyder confronted when Ithaca city officials de-
cided to remove his aluminum towers from the bridge is paradigmatic of
the sort of problem that artists often confront when they are commis-
sioned by government entities to create artworks for specific public sites.
When a commissioning entity (and owner of the art) later decides it
wants to remove the works, a battle ensues over whose rights trump
whose-the artist's right to prevent the destruction or distortion of her
work or the owner's right to dispose of its property as it pleases.
Before 1990, artists like Snyder had no recourse when government
art owners decided to remove site-specific artworks from their sites. 8 An
American artist's protestations regarding any modification of a commis-
sioned work were legally irrelevant, because American law dictated that
the owner's right to do what she pleased with her property eclipsed
whatever interest the artist might have in preserving her creation as is.
That interest would have been elsewhere protected by a legal doctrine
known as moral rights, which safeguards an artist's reputation by prohib-
iting the owner of her art from distorting, mutilating, and, often, destroy-
ing the work.9 However, while many other countries had long
recognized the doctrine of moral rights, the United States did not em-
brace that doctrine until recently.' 0 In 1990, Congress did legislate
moral rights for artists of certain visual works of art when it passed the
Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA). I I Under VARA, artists working in
America suddenly had rights to prevent future owners of their artwork
from physically distorting, mutilating, modifying and, in some cases, de-
stroying their work. 12
7 See id.
8 For example, in the 1980s artist Richard Serra faced a similar situation when the Gen-
eral Services Administration of the Federal Government (GSA) decided to remove Serra's
work Tilted Arc from a public plaza in Manhattan. The GSA commissioned Serra to design
the work for that very site four years earlier, and Serra was unable to prevent its removal. See
Serra v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 664 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) dismissed in
part, 667 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), afftd, 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988). See discussion
infra Part I.
9 See Edward Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative
Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1741-42 (1984).
10 See, e.g., 2 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLEC-
TORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 943 (2d ed. 1988); see also Russell J. DaSilva, Droit
Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the United
States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 1 (1980) reprinted in ART LAW: RIGHTS AND LIA-
BILITIES OF CREATORS AND COLLECTORS 470-72 (Franklin Feldman et al. eds., 1986).
I Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified in
part as 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (1990)).
12 See id.
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Still, while Snyder may have the right to prevent the City of Ithaca
from physically modifying or destroying the towers themselves, it is not
clear that the city's conceptual destruction of the works-as would be
accomplished by their careful removal and relocation from the bridge-
would constitute a violation of Snyder's moral rights under VARA.
Since each of the four structures is bolted to an individual concrete post
on the bridge, the city can easily remove the structures without physi-
cally damaging them. Nonetheless, Snyder argues that this removal
would effectively destroy his work. The artist contends that Silent City is
not simply the structures alone, but is the bridge and the structures to-
gether.' 3 Thus, the only way that Snyder could successfully claim that
the removal of Silent City would violate his moral rights is if he could
convince a court that such removal would constitute destruction despite
the absence of consequent physical damage to the piece.
Since Congress' enactment of VARA, no court has squarely con-
fronted the question of whether removing a government-commissioned
site-specific work from its context constitutes a violation of the artist's
rights under the statute. While that recognition is necessary, as made
clear by the opinions of a number of artists, critics, and legal scholars,
such an acknowledgement would push the United States' narrow grant of
moral rights protection to its absolute limits. Congress was hesitant to
draft moral rights legislation because these rights imply a non-con-
tracted-for exception to economic property rights.' 4 That is, interpreting
VARA to allow a government-commissioned artist to prevent the re-
moval of her site-specific artwork would potentially bind public property
indefinitely. This would seem to be Congress' worst nightmare. Unfet-
tered moral rights protection for such artists would effectively privatize
public land-and a lot of it. Since the Kennedy administration estab-
lished the United States General Services Administration Art-in-Archi-
tecture program in 1963, the federal government has commissioned over
200 works for public spaces.' 5
VARA protection is therefore a mixed blessing. If artists can pre-
vent art owners from removing public-commissioned site-specific work
from their contexts, both the art owners and the artists face serious di-
lemmas. For example, since VARA provides that an artist may enforce
13 Telephone Interview, supra note 1.
14 See, e.g., Louise Nemschoff, A Rose By Any Other Name: The U.S. and Moral Rights,
in MORAL RIGHTs 166 (Cees van Rij & Hubert Best eds., 1995).
15 See 2000 GSA Design Awards, at http://www.gsa.gov/pbs/pc/nw-files/00/preface/
preface.hthttp://hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/pc/nw-files/00/preface/preface.htmm (n.d.). Under the Art-
In-Architecture program, the GSA donates one-half of one percent of its total projected con-
struction costs for each federal building to financing artwork for particular public spaces. See
http://www.gsa.gov (Public Buildings > Art in GSA Buildings > Art in Architecture Program)
(n.d.).
2001]
206 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 11:203
her moral rights in an artwork for the duration of her life,16 the commis-
sioning party (i.e., the owner) may have to tolerate a structure on public
land for 50 or more years even if the artwork may prevent the owner
from using the land to its best potential. In fear of committing public
land to this sort of inflexibility, federal, state, and local governments may
choose not to commission artwork for public spaces, thereby diminishing
opportunities for artists to express ideas, and depriving communities of
cultural and aesthetic images in prime gathering areas. Congress antici-
pated similar problems regarding artwork installed in buildings; and, to
ensure that real estate remained alienable, it included a real estate waiver
provision under VARA.' 7 The provision allows patrons to contract with
artists who install works in buildings to ensure that the artists do not
enforce their moral rights if the work could not be removed without be-
ing destroyed.' 8 However, Congress did not enact a similar provision
with regard to site-specific art.
This Note contends that courts should find that conceptual destruc-
tion of the sort that would ensue if Snyder's structures were removed,
constitutes a violation of VARA. Further, to address the alienability di-
lemma discussed above, the Note proposes that Congress should amend
VARA to include a limited waiver of moral rights when an artist agrees
with a government entity to install a work in a public space. This Note
contends that such a waiver would be valuable because: (1) it would
eliminate the potential for artists to bind public-owned land for the dura-
tions of the artists' lives, regardless of the public's interest in removing
the artist's work; and (2) it would prevent discouraged patrons from de-
clining to commission such works which, in turn, could lead to substan-
tial decline in commercial opportunities for artists.
Part I of this Note discusses the origins of the doctrine of moral
rights in French law, and examines the role of moral rights in American
law prior to VARA. Part II analyzes the incentives leading to the United
States' adoption and codification of moral rights under VARA. Part III
looks at the various hurdles an artist must overcome to prevent destruc-
tion of her artwork under VARA. Part IV looks at the status of site-
specific art as protected by the statute, and argues that courts must find
that conceptually destroying such art by removing it from its context,
even without physically harming the crafted work, constitutes a violation
of VARA. This part further urges Congress to amend the statute to pro-
vide a limited waiver clause, similar to the one that already exists under
VARA, to help preclude artists from enforcing their moral rights when a
16 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(l)(a) (1990).
17 See id. § 113(d).
18 Id.
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federal, state, or local government removes the artist's site-specific work
from its context.
I. HISTORY OF THE MORAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE IN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES
A. ORIGINS OF MORAL RIGHTS: FRANCE AND THE DROIT MORAL
The concept of moral rights stems from the French droit d'auteur
("authorship rights"), which protect an artist's rights regarding her cre-
ations.' 9 French scholars regard the authorship rights as rights founded
upon the spirit of individualism and the principles of the French Revolu-
tion, the source of modern French jurisprudence.20 Such rights are not
economic, but natural and personal.2' Accordingly, a work belongs to its
creator in a way that transcends the sale of the work to a new owner.22
French law divides the authorship rights into two subsets of rights:
droits patrimonaux ("patrimonial rights"), which protect an artist's pecu-
niary rights, and droit moral ("moral rights"), which protect an artist's
rights in her creation even once the work has become a public commod-
ity.23 The patrimonial rights are analogous to American copyright law.24
They can be transferred and sold, and expire after a specified amount of
time.25 On the other hand, moral rights are personal, un-assignable, ina-
lienable and perpetual. 26 Moral rights derive from the notion that when
an artist creates a work of art, she imbues herself-her mind, personality
and spirit-into her creation. 27 In return for that gift of creativity, the
artist retains a moral right for society to respect her creation.28 The
French regard moral rights as natural rights, "independent from and su-
perior to any pecuniary interest in a work of art." 29 In fact, the French
contend that an artist secures and asserts her pecuniary interest in a work
by virtue of moral rights. 30
19 See DaSilva, supra note 10, at 437-39.
20 Id. at 442-43.
21 Id. at 437-38.
22 See, e.g., LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 10, at 947.
23 See DaSilva, supra note 10, at 437.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 437-38.
26 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 10, at 947.
27 See, e.g., Eric M. Brooks, Comment, "Tilted" Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral
Rights After U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 CALIF. L. RaV. 1431, 1434 (1989).
28 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 10, at 943; DaSilva, supra note 10, at 446.
29 DaSilva, supra note 10, at 438.
30 See id. at 439.
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1. Codification
Prior to the French Revolution, French law was splintered along
regional lines and lacking in national uniformity. 31 As a result, the senti-
ment that both public and private law should be uniform and recognize
the natural rights of all people, rather than just a privileged few, was a
central feature of the Revolutionary Settlement. 32 Following the over-
throw of the traditional birthright monarchical system and the ensuing
reconstruction of France's social structure, Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte
furthered a campaign to devise a codified national legal system. 33 The
revolutionary Constitution of 1791 dictated that France was to have a
civil code, though efforts to execute such a body of law proved unsuc-
cessful until 1804. 34 Adhering to the political tone of France's Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man of 1789,35 the drafters of the Civil Code
worked towards the goal of codifying the "universal, unchanging law
that is the source of all positive law; [that is] the natural reason that
governs all peoples of the world."'36 The Civil, or Napoleonic, Code thus
laid the foundation for a legal system reliant upon such theories of natu-
ral law. 37
31 See RENE DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 7
(Michael Kindred trans., 1972).
32 See DAVID POLLARD, SOURCEBOOK ON FRENCH LAW iX (1996).
33 See id.
34 DAVID, supra note 31, at 12.
35 The Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 was the first of a series of written
constitutions in France. See POLLARD, supra note 32. Seeking to embody the fundamental
rights of man, the document states in part in its opening sentence:
The representatives of the French people, organized as a National Assembly, believ-
ing that the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole cause of
all public calamities, and of the corruption of governments, have determined to set
forth in a solemn declaration the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man, in
order that this declaration, being constantly before all members of the Social Body,
shall remind them continually of their rights and duties...
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1789) reprinted in POLLARD, supra note 32, at 33-35.
For translation, see www.barvennon.coml-liberty/Declaration of-rightsfoLman.html (n.d).
36 DAVID, supra note 27, at 14 n.13 (quoting Article I of the draft of the Civil Code).
37 Interestingly, the French Civil Code of 1804 emphasized the unconditional nature of
the individual's private rights of property. That concept, initially grounded in the Declaration
of the Rights of Man (1789), discussed supra note 35, marked the new era of the triumph of
individualism over absolutism. See VINDING KRUSE, THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 7 (1939). Spe-
cifically, the French Civil Code of 1804 stated: "The right of property is the right to enjoy and
dispose of objects in the most absolute manner provided the owner does not exercise his use in
a manner prohibited by law or ordinance." See id. (citing the French Civil Code, art. 544
(1804)). Therefore, it is not surprising that the doctrine of moral rights did not emerge in the
post-revolutionary climate. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Yet, at the same time,
one would suppose that, since the Civil Code also emphasized natural law, the moral rights
doctrine-which is grounded in natural law-would have emerged as an exception to property
rights. But France did not take that next step until nearly a century later. See infra note 39.
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Among the laws that the French enacted during the radical post-
revolutionary period was the loi du 19-24 juillet 1793 (law of July 19-24,
1793), a pioneering copyright law that articulated the patrimonial
rights.38 Moral rights were not codified in that statute, but instead
emerged from judicially created doctrines dating back to the late nine-
teenth century. 39
In the middle of the twentieth century, the French soldered together
the natural and pecuniary rights of an author in her creative work when it
codified moral rights and patrimonial rights in the loi du 11 mars 1957
(Law of March 11, 1957).40 While that law has since been repealed and
replaced by the Code De La Propriete Intellectuelle,4' ("Intellectual
Property Code"), the latter law does not alter the moral rights doctrine as
codified in the 1957 Law.42 In its opening sentence, the 1957 Law cap-
tured the essence of the natural right concept of authorship rights: "The
author of a work of the spirit enjoys in that work, by sole virtue of its
creation, a right of incorporeal property, exclusive and opposable against
all."'43 Under that statute, moral rights were "perpetual, inalienable, and
imperscriptible."44
The droit a la paternite ("right of attribution") and the droit au re-
spect de l'oeuvre ("right of integrity") are moral rights that were codified
in the same clause of article 6 of the 1957 Law.45 Those rights are the
most important of moral rights.46 They are the two rights consistently
38 COLLECTION COMPLETE DES Lois 29-32 (J.B. Duvergier ed., Paris, Guyot et Scribe,
Libraires-Editeurs 2d ed. 1834). The Law of July 19-24, 1793 offered a prototype for copy-
right legislation around the world. Specifically, the French parliament enacted the law to bal-
ance the author's pecuniary interest in her work and of the public's interest in accessing
creative works. Accordingly, the law gave authors the exclusive right to reproduction for a
limited period of time. See MAKEEN FOUAD MAKEEN, COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION
SOCIETY: THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL, U.S., U.K., AND
FRENCH LAW 9 (2000).
39 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 10, at 947 (stating that moral rights were first
recognized in 1874).
40 Loi du 11 mars 1957 sur la propriete litteraire artistique, 1957, J. 0., translated in
UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1976) [hereinafter 1957 Law].
41 Title II, Ch. ler, Art. L. 121-laL, 121-9 (Fr.) [hereinafter I.P. Code].
42 ANDRI LUCAS & ROBERT PLAISANT, France, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1(1) (Paul Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds., 2000).
43 Id. at art. 1, 1 1.
44 Id. at art. 6.
45 Id. at art. 6, 1. The relevant clause in article 6 states: "The author enjoys the right to
have his name, his status as author, and his work respected." Id.
46 Under the French droit moral, two rights in addition to the right of attribution and the
right of integrity are traditionally reserved for the artist when she creates a work: the droit de
divulgation (right of disclosure/publication), and the droit de retrait ou de repentir (right to
withdraw work from publication or right to make modification after publication). See LERNER
& BRESLER, supra note 10, at 945-46.
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recognized by numerous countries around the world,47 embodied in inter-
national copyright law,4 8 and codified under VARA.4 9 The French right
of attribution is comprised of three rights:
First, an author has a right to be recognized by name as
the author of his work. Second, the author has a right to
prevent his work from being attributed to someone else.
And, third, the author has a right to prevent his name
from being used on works which he did not in fact
create. 50
The French right of integrity is considered to be the most essential
part of the moral rights doctrine. 51 It grants the artist the power to pro-
tect her work from intentional mutilation, distortion, or destruction.5 2
47 See generally Hubert Best, Survey, in MORAL RIGHTS 241-82 (Cees van Rij & Hubert
Best eds., 1995).
48 See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened
for signature Sept. 9, 1886 (amended July 24, 1971), Article 6bis, reprinted in WORLD INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (1978) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
49 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. Section 106A provides in relevant part:
a) Rights of attribution and integrity- . . . [t]he author of a work of visual art-
1) shall have the right
A) to claim authorship of that work, and
B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual
art which he or she did not create;
2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the
work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification
of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and
3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have the right-
A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of
that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and
any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a
violation of that right, and
B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any inten-
tional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that
right.
50 See DaSilva, supra note 10, at 460.
51 Id. at 464 ("[The right of integrity] is considered by virtually all scholars to be the
most essential part of droit moral.").
52 However, there has been considerable debate over whether the French moral rights
doctrine allows artists to prevent the complete destruction of their works. See, e.g., Lacasse et
Welcome v. Abbe Quenard, CA Paris, Apr. 27, 1934, D.P. II, 385 discussed in John Henry
Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1034 (finding no vio-
lation of artist's moral rights when artwork was completely destroyed). See also Marina San-
tilli, United States' Moral Rights Developments in European Perspective, 1 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 89, 100 (1997) (" '[T]he fight to prevent destruction' . . . [is] a right that remains
quite controversial in Europe... [T]he right of integrity as construed in most civil law coun-
tries [is a right which] arguably provides no protection against complete destruction of the
work."); LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 10, at 947 (noting that French droit au respect de
l'oeuvre does not explicitly protect against complete destruction of artwork). But see Damich,
supra note 9, at 1742 ("The [French] right of integrity also includes a prohibition against...
complete destruction;" citing Le Salon d'Ete de Jean Dubuffet, SOCIETE DE LA PROPRIETE
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Today, the moral rights doctrine is codified in the Intellectual Prop-
erty Code.53 Enacted in 1992, that code, like the 1957 Law, codifies
economic rights along with moral rights in a single statute. The Intellec-
tual Property Code clearly considers moral rights an exception to prop-
erty rights:
The author of a work of the mind shall enjoy in that
work, by mere fact of its creation, an exclusive incorpo-
real property right which shall be enforceable against all
persons. This right shall include attributes of an intellec-
tual and moral nature as also attributes of an economic
nature . . . The incorporeal property right . . . shall be
independent of any property right in the physical
object.54
2. Case law
French courts have tested the breadth of the right of integrity in a
number of cases. Generally, the case law suggests that the threat of
physical destruction of the actual artwork is not required. The change of
context-or decontextualization-resulting in the conceptual destruction
is enough for the artist to assert her moral rights.
Perhaps most notable is the classic case of Fersing v. Buffet,55 in
which the Paris Court of Appeals determined that dismantling a work of
art into its component pieces, and then selling the pieces as individual
works, constituted a violation of the artist's right of integrity. 56 'The
court reasoned that the work at issue was an artistic unit, and removing
one of its components from its context distorted the entire work of art.57
In Fersing, the artist Bernard Buffet had painted a composition on
all sides of a refrigerator that was to be auctioned in Paris. Although the
composition consisted of six panels, three on the front, one on the top,
and one on either side of the refrigerator, Buffet considered the panels to
ARTISTIQUE ET DES DESSMS ET MODELES, June-Oct. 1983, at 1, nos. 7-8, (discussing the Judg-
ment of Mar. 16, 1983, Cass. le 1983 D., where the French Supreme Court recognized artist's
moral right to prevent complete destruction of his artwork)); Andre Francon & Jane C. Gins-
burg, Author's Rights in France: The Moral Right of the Creator of a Commissioned Work to
Compel the Commissioning Party to Complete the Work, 9 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381,
382 (1985) ("The concept of destruction or mutilation extends to more than physical damage
to works of the plastic arts. It denotes any nonconsensual alteration to a work of
authorship...").
53 See I.P. Code, supra note 41.
54 I.P. Code, Titre I, Ch. ler, Art. L. 11-1 a. L. 111-3.
55 CA Paris, May 30, 1962, D. Jur. 1962, 570; Cass. chs. exprops., 6 juillet [July 6],
1965, Gaz. Pal. 1965, 2, pan. jurispr. 126, construed in Merryman, supra note 52, at 1023.
56 Id. See Merryman, supra note 52, at 1027; DaSilva, supra note 10, at 465.
57 See Merryman, supra note 52, at 1027.
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exist together as one painting. 58 Six months after the refrigerator was
auctioned, a catalog for another auction listed a "Still Life With Fruits"
by Bernard Buffet, described as a painting on metal.59 It became clear
that the owner of the refrigerator dismantled it and proposed to sell each
panel as an individual artwork.60 Buffet protested the sale, contending
that the refrigerator was a single indivisible artwork. 6' The Paris Court
of Appeals held that the sale of each panel as a separate work was pro-
hibited as a violation of Buffet's right of integrity. 62 This decision was
affirmed. 63
The disposition in Fersing demonstrates that the French consider
the decontextualization of an artwork to constitute a violation of an art-
ist's expression of her personality. That is, this decontextualization ad-
versely affects the artist's reputation and honor, thereby impairing her
legally protected integrity interest.64
In another case addressing the decontextualization of a work, a
French court ruled that Twentieth Century Fox violated a group of Rus-
sian composers' moral rights when it used their compositions in a film
containing themes that were offensive to them.65 Specifically, the court
found that the production company infringed upon the artists' rights of
integrity when it injected the music into an unintended context.66
French courts have also found that altering the context of a work by
adding or subtracting artistic elements constitutes a violation of the art-
ist's integrity right. In Ldger v. Reunion des Theatres Lyriques Nation-
aux,
6 7 the court found that a theatre violated the artist Leger's moral
rights when it omitted, without the artist's consent, certain stage settings
from the context of a group of settings that the artist designed for an
opera.68 Similarly, in a case involving reproductions of Henri Rousseau
paintings, a French court found that the "different colors and altered
images" employed in the reproductions violated the artist's right of integ-
rity.69 More recently, in the case of The Asphalt Jungle, a French court
58 Id. at 1023.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1023 n.l.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1023, 1027.
63 See DaSilva, supra note 10, at 465.
64 See Merryman, supra note 52, at 1027.
65 Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox American Twentieth Cen-
tury, CA Paris, Jan. 13, 1953, Gaz. Pal. 1954, 2, pan. jurispr., construed in DaSilva, supra note
10, at 435-36.
66 See id.
67 Tribunal civil de la Seine, 1955, 6 R.I.D.A. 146, construed in Merryman, supra note
52, at 1029-30.
68 See Merryman, supra note 52, at 1029-30.
69 Bernard-Rousseau v. Soc. des Galeries Lafayette, T.G.I. Paris, Mar. 13, 1973, 48
J.C.P. 224, construed in Merryman, supra note 52, at 1030-31.
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found that colorizing a movie when the filmmakers intended for it to be
shown in black and white, violated the artists' moral right of integrity. 70
French courts also have found violations of the integrity right when dec-
orative elements surrounding a photograph were eliminated,71 when a
drawing was mutilated by the addition of colors and the omission of cer-
tain parts, 72 and when constructions were added to a group of architec-
tural structures. 73
Further, French case law suggests that removing a work from its
original location, distorting it, and then relocating the damaged work for
display in a new context, unintended by the artist, constitutes a violation
of the artist's integrity right. For example, when a city council removed
an artist's site-specific sculpture from its context, broke it up and used its
pieces to fill holes in the road, the court found that the destruction vio-
lated the artist's integrity right. 74
B. MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
1. A History of Reticence
Although efforts to enact federal moral rights legislation date back
to 1979, 75 the United States has traditionally resisted the idea of granting
artists such rights despite the fact that nearly seventy countries around
the world formally recognized moral rights. 76 Such reticence stemmed
from concern that natural, or "personality," rights conflicted with Ameri-
can common law, which traditionally took a commercial approach to the
process of creating art.77
70 Versailles, ch. rduns., 19 Dec. 1994, R.I.D.A. 1995, no. 164, 389, noted in LUCAS &
PLAISANT, supra note 42, § 7[1][c][ii], FRA-101.
71 TGI Paris le ch., 26 June 1985, D. 1986, inf. rap. 184, obs. Colombet, noted in LUCAS
& PLAISANT, supra note 42, § 7[l][c][ii], FRA-99.
72 Paris 4e ch., 31 Oct. 1988, C.D.A. Apr. 1989, 22, noted in LUCAS & PLAISANT, supra
note 42, § 7[l][c][ii], FRA-99.
73 Riom, 26 May 1966, J.C.P. 1967, II, 15183, note Boursigot, noted in LUCAS &
PLAISANT, supra note 42, § 7[l][c][ii], FRA-99.
74 See Sudre v. Commune de Baixas, Conseil d'Etat, 1936, D.P. HI, 57, construed in
Merryman, supra note 52, at 1034.
75 See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 8 (1990) (referring to prior proposed legislation ad-
dressing moral rights, as follows: H.R. 288, 96th Cong., 125 CONG. REc. 164 (1979); H.R.
2908, 97th Cong., 127 CONG. REC. H5691 (1981); H.R. 1521, 98th Cong., 129 CONG. REC.
2414 (1983); S.2796, 99th Cong., 132 CONG. REC. S12, 185 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986); S. 1619,
100th Cong., 133 CONG. REC. E3425 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987)). FINAL REPORT OF THE REGIS-
TER OF COPYRIGHTS, WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS IN VISUAL ARTWORKS 6 n.21. (1996) [here-
inafter WAIVER REPORT].
76 Moral Rights In Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S. 1198 and S. 1253 Before the
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 19, 76 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) [hereinafter Moral Rights Hearings].
77 See Nemschoff, supra note 14, at 166.
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Specifically, recognition of a moral right to control the use of chat-
tel after transfer or sale contradicted common law property notions of
free alienability and absolute ownership against the world. While copy-
right law may have a similar effect of carving out an exception to owner-
ship rights, it does so to bolster pecuniary gain. That is, copyright law
balances the author's interest in profiting from her creations with the
public's interest in accessing the works. 78 The result is that society as a
whole benefits from the access. 79 Moral rights, on the other hand, func-
tion to protect personality, as opposed to financial interests, and do not so
readily benefit the public. This is particularly so if the public's interests
oppose the artist's interests, as when, for example, the location of a
sculpture prevents a community from installing a playground or benches,
thereby inhibiting outside play and communal gathering.
The United States has refused to recognize an exception to an art
owner's property rights when the artist had not contracted to retain post-
sale rights.80 While moral rights generally carve out an exception to the
property rights of the owner of the artwork by allowing the artist to pre-
vent the property from being physically violated without the owner hav-
ing bargained for that right, artists in the United States traditionally have
had to contract to prevent the owner from disposing of her property as
she wishes.8 '
Additional resistance to moral rights legislation stemmed from con-
cern that it might "depress the healthy American art market" by discour-
aging patrons from commissioning works by contemporary artists, 82 and
by causing the number of copyrighted works to decline.83 Also, oppo-
nents to this legislation maintained that existing law such as common law
contract, defamation, libel, right of publicity, right to privacy, and certain
federal statutes such as the Federal Copyright84 and the Trademark Act
of 1946 (Lanham Trade-Mark Act)85 adequately protected the artist's in-
terest in attribution and integrity. 86 Some feared that federal moral rights
78 See, e.g., Moral Rights Hearings, supra note 76, at 2 (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
79 See, e.g., LERNER & BRESSLER, supra note 10, at 950.
80 See Gerald Dworkin, Moral Rights in Common Law Countries, in MORAL RiGHTs 37,
40 (1995); DaSilva, supra note 10, at 438 ("It is no longer uncommon in this country, moreo-
ver, to find [rights similar to moral] rights secured by artists by contract."); Moral Rights
Hearings, supra note 76, at 19 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I must also mention my concern
about the imposition of moral rights concepts by federal statute rather than through the bar-
gaining of the parties to the transaction.").
81 See Dworkin, supra note 80, at 40.
82 Moral Rights Hearings, supra note 76, at 19 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (relaying some
popular concerns regarding moral rights legislation).
83 See id. at 77 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
84 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000).
85 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).
86 See The Berne Convention: Hearings on S. 1301 and S. 1971 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyright and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 65-6
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legislation might even preempt the growth of state law by borrowing
portions of certain common law doctrines and leaving the remaining, or
un-federalized, portion of the common law doctrines in an uncertain
state.
87
While legislatures and courts were traditionally reticent to try to rec-
oncile moral rights with existing American law, many artists and politi-
cians attempted to introduce the concept into the United States via court
cases and lobbying. Although some state legislatures did eventually
mandate moral rights by codifying the rights of attribution and integrity,
state and federal courts have traditionally refused to recognize the
doctrine. 88
(1988) [hereinafter Berne Convention Hearings] (Carlos J. Moorhead, Chairman, Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Prop.) (supporting adherence to Berne Convention with explanation
of how compliance could be achieved without adopting the moral rights doctrine).
87 See id. at 46 (statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, Wis.).
88 In the late 1970s, states independently began to respond to artists' needs for rights
distinct from the economic rights of their works' owners. Two separate approaches emerged,
with California pioneering the Preservation Act in 1979, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West
Supp. 1999), and New York introducing the Artists' Rights Act in 1984, see N.Y. ARTS &
CULT. Ari. LAW §§ 14.01 et seq. (McKinney 1999). The California approach aims at preserv-
ing works of art for the public good and out of respect for the artist's moral rights. This is a
preservationist approach. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 987. The New York approach aims at protect-
ing the artist's reputation and can be invoked only if there is evidence that the artist's reputa-
tion had been damaged in the course of public display. This is an artist's rights approach. See
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.01 et seq. While the California Preservation Act, and
similar state preservationist statutes, is primarily aimed at preserving the artwork, the New
York Act aims at preventing damage to the artist's reputation. What resulted were two camps
of state statutes with some states legislating preservation acts and others legislating artists'
rights acts.
The California Preservation Act seeks to preserve works of art for the benefit of society
and protect the artist's moral rights. The Act legislates the moral rights of attribution and
integrity by prohibiting the defacement, mutilation, alteration or destruction of a work, and
mandating that the artist has a right to claim authorship of her work. These rights may be
waived in a written agreement. One exception to those rights arises when an artist installs her
work in a building in a manner that renders destruction inevitable in the event that the building
owner decides to remove the work. If the owner wants to remove an installed work, and she
can do so without damaging the work, she must notify the artist of her intention, and give the
artist an opportunity to remove the work, in order to avoid liability. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 987(c) and (d). But if the work cannot be removed without damage or destruction, the
statute dictates that moral rights are waived unless the parties have contracted otherwise. Id.
Contrary to the artists' rights statutes, the California Preservation Act does not require that the
owner publicly display the damaged artwork for an artist to assert her moral rights. In fact,
threat to the artist's reputation is not necessary, as simply damaging the artwork constitutes a
violation under the California Preservation Act.
Like California, Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s - 42-116t (West 1999),
Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 231, § 855 (West Supp. 1999), and Pennsylvania,
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110 (Purdon Supp. 1999) have enacted preservation statutes
that protect artists' moral rights of integrity and attribution and aim at preserving the artwork.
See WAIVER REPORT, supra note 75, at 12.
The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act, N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.01 et
seq., (New York Act) prohibits the knowing display of an artwork in an "altered, defaced,
mutilated, or modified form." Id. The New York Act also provides for the right of attribution.
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2. Judicial Determination of the Doctrine
Meliodon v. School District of Philadelphia89 is an early example of
a court's resistance to preserving the integrity of an artwork at the ex-
pense of the owner's autonomy over her property. In that case, decided
in 1938, an artist sought equitable relief from a Philadelphia school dis-
trict when the district altered sculptures it had commissioned the artist to
design.90 The artist sought an injunction directing the school district to
tear down the altered sculptures and permit the artist to replace the works
at the school district's expense. 91 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dis-
missed the artist's bill in equity and denied his request for an injunc-
tion.92 The court denied the relief because the school district, not the
artist, owned the artwork and at that time American law did not recog-
nize a moral rights exception to the art owners' complete autonomy over
her work.93
In Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation,94 de-
cided in 1948, a New York court refused to recognize that placing a work
in an unintended context, and thereby misrepresenting the underlying
meaning of the art, constituted a violation of the artist's rights. In Shos-
takovich, a group of composers asserted that a movie studio violated its
moral rights when the studio used the plaintiffs' musical compositions as
background music in the film "The Iron Curtain," which depicts acts of
espionage in Canada attributed to representatives of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic.95 Although they had not copyrighted their work, the
plaintiffs, who were internationally renowned and who were citizens of
the U.S.S.R., objected to the unauthorized use of their music and the use
of their names in the credit lines of the film. 96 They contended that the
use of their music and their names wrongfully implied that they sup-
ported the film's anti-Soviet theme, and thereby cast upon them "'the
false imputation of being disloyal to their country."' 97 They therefore
See id. Since the New York Act aims primarily at protecting the artist's reputation, it does not
guard against complete destruction. States that have enacted artists' rights statutes similar to
the New York Act include, Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-2156 (Purdon West
1999), Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1999), New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:24A-1 - 2A:24A-8 (West 1999), and Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 5-62-2 - 5-62-6
(Michie 1994).
89 195 A. 905 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1938).
90 Id. at 905.
91 Id. at 906.
92 Id.
93 Id. The court noted in dicta that although the artist was not entitled to equitable relief,
he was certainly entitled to commence an action in tort against the superintendent of the Board
of Education, at whose direction the alterations had taken place. Id. at 905.
94 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
95 Id. at 576-77.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 578.
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asserted that the use of their work and names in an objectionable context
violated their moral rights.98 The court rejected that theory on grounds
that the moral rights doctrine was not recognized in the United States.99
Denying relief, the court stated:
The application of the doctrine presents much diffi-
culty. . .With reference to that which is in the public
domain there arises a conflict between the moral right
and the well established rights of others to use such
works. So, too, there arises the question of the norm by
which the use of such work is to be tested to determine
whether or not the author's moral right as an author has
been violated ... In the present state of our law the very
existence of the right is not clear, the relative position of
the rights thereunder with reference to the rights of
others is not defined nor has the nature of the proper
remedy been determined.l °°
Accordingly, the court dismissed the case because the plaintiffs had
not established a valid cause of action. 10 1
In the 1947 case Vargas v. Esquire,10 2 the Seventh Circuit refused
to recognize the moral right of attribution. In that case, the artist Vargas
entered into an agreement with Esquire Magazine, by which Esquire em-
ployed Vargas to produce artwork for the magazine and for a calendar
published by the magazine. 10 3 While the artwork - a series of individual
pictures - initially bore the name "Vargas," the parties agreed to change
the name to "Varga," and the pictures were later published with the
words "Varga Girls."'1 4 However, after Vargas cancelled his contract
with Esquire, the company published his pictures with the words "The
Esquire Girl" on each without attributing the work to Vargas. 10 5 Al-
though Esquire had paid for the pictures, Vargas asserted that the com-
pany had a duty to credit Vargas as the author of the work. 106 The
Seventh Circuit contended that since the contract explicitly stated that the
pictures and the names "Varga," "Varga Girl," and "Varga Esq." be-
98 Id. at 577.
99 Id. at 579.
100 Id. at 578-79.
101 Id. After being denied relief in New York, Plaintiffs filed a case in a French court,
alleging the same facts and legal theories, and won. See Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox
Europe et Soc. Fox American Twentieth Century, CA Paris, Jan. 13, 1953, Gaz. Pal. 1954, 2,
pan. jurispr., construed in DaSilva, supra note 10, at 435-36 (discussing the disparity in ways
the American court and the French court handled the same case).
102 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
103 Id. at 523.
104 See id. at 523-24.
105 See id. at 524.
106 Id.
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longed exclusively to Esquire, Vargas "divested himself of every vestige
of title and ownership of the pictures, as well as the right to their posses-
sion, control and use." 107 Accordingly, the court found in favor of the
magazine. 10 8 In so ruling, the court rejected the artist's theory that his
moral right to attribution had been violated. The court stated that such
rights did not exist in the United States and that it would not "make any
new law in this respect."'10 9
Two years after Vargas, the New York State Supreme Court em-
ployed similar reasoning when it refused to find that the complete de-
struction of an artwork violated the artist's moral rights. In Crimi v.
Rutgers Presbytarian Church in the City of New York, 110 artist Alfred
Crimi brought an action against Rutgers Presbytarian Church after it
painted over a fresco that it had commissioned Crimi to paint several
years earlier."' Although the contract regarding the project designated
the church as "Owner" and Crimi as "Artist," assigned copyright to the
church, and specifically provided that the fresco would become part of
the church building as soon as it was affixed to the chancel wall, Crimi
maintained that the obliteration of his work constituted a breach of cus-
tom and usage and violated his continued limited proprietary interest in
the work to the extent necessary to protect his "honor and reputation as
an artist."' 12 Along with that right, Crimi asserted, came the right to
prevent his work from being destroyed, mutilated, obliterated or
altered. 113
Considering whether Crimi had any continued interest in the fresco,
the court addressed the European moral rights doctrine. 1 4 The court de-
termined that the complete destruction of Crimi's work, as opposed to
mere distortion, would not give the artist a right under the doctrine. Anal-
ogizing the case to the French case Lacasse et Welcome v. Abbe
Quenard, 115 the court noted that the prevailing sentiment was that an
artist cannot prevent the complete destruction of her work since such
disposal would not compromise her honor or reputation.'16 The court
further reasoned that even if Crimi could claim his moral rights had been
107 Id. at 525.
108 Id. at 525-26.
109 Id.
110 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
111 Id. at 815.
112 Id. at 815-16.
113 Id. at 816.
114 Id. at 816-18.
115 CA Paris, Apr. 27, 1934, D.P. II, 1934, 385, construed in Merryman, supra note 52, at
1034. In Lacasse et Welcome, the Pans Court of Appeals ruled that the artist could not prevent
the church owner from destroying the artist's fresco because total destruction would not
threaten the artist's reputation. Id.
116 See Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 816-17.
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violated under the civil law doctrine, that doctrine was not recognized in
the United States. 1 7 Denying relief, the court stated: "The time for the
artist to have reserved any rights was when he and his attorney partici-
pated in the drawing of the contract with the church."' 1 8
By the mid-seventies, the Second Circuit in Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Cos. 119 suggested that an American court might be willing
to accept the doctrine. In that 1976 case, a group of British comedic
actors known as Monty Python sought to preliminarily enjoin the Ameri-
can Broadcasting Company from airing edited versions of three pro-
grams originally written and performed by the group for the British
Broadcasting Company. 120 The actors contended that the editing im-
paired the integrity of their work by mutilating it, and they sought redress
from the alleged deformation.' 2'
Monty Python claimed that the editing and subsequent broadcast of
the altered works violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 122 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a). They claimed that, although the Act dealt with trademark, it
could be invoked to prevent misrepresentations that might injure one's
business or personal reputation even where no trademark is involved. 123
The court agreed with the artists, holding that "an allegation that a defen-
dant has presented to the public a 'garbled,' distorted version of plain-
tiff's work seeks to redress the very rights sought to be protected by the
Lanham Act ... and should be recognized as stating a cause of action
under that statute."' 24
The court in Gilliam noted that American copyright law did not rec-
ognize moral rights because copyright seeks only to vindicate economic
rights. 125 Still, the court emphasized, "the economic incentive for artistic
and intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for American copy-
right law ... cannot be reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain
relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the public on
which the artists are financially dependent."' 2 6 In noting the integral re-
lationship between public perception of an artist and an artist's financial
gain, the court highlighted a loophole in traditional construction of copy-
right law. Specifically, the court pointed to how failure to prevent the
physical disruption of a work could negate the purpose of copyright pro-
117 Id. at 818.
118 Id. at 819.
119 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
120 Id. at 17.
121 Id. at 24.
122 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).
123 See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
124 Id. (citations omitted).
125 Id.
126 Id. (citations omitted).
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tection altogether by diminishing an artist's profit potential and reducing
incentive to create further.127 In recognizing the importance of ensuring
such protection, the court in Gilliam opened a potential channel for art-
ists to assert moral rights under American law.
Despite the Gilliam ruling, in 1987 the Southern District of New
York ruled in Serra v. United States 28 that an artist had no cause of
action when the federal government removed commissioned site-specific
artwork from its context. The Second Circuit later affirmed.129 In 1979
the General Services Administration of the Federal Government (GSA)
commissioned Richard Serra to create a sculpture for 26 Federal Plaza at
Foley Square in Manhattan. 130 Serra installed his sculpture, Tilted Arc,
in 1981.131 The 120'x 12' slab of curved Cor-Ten steel that bisected the
plaza was "conceived and created in relation to the particular conditions
of a specific site."'132 Serra contended that the work was "artistically
inseparable" from the Federal Plaza, and thus that its removal would de-
stroy it. 133 When the GSA decided to remove and relocate Tilted Arc in
response to the public's distaste for the work, Serra filed a suit against
GSA and its administrators. 34 He protested the removal on the grounds
that it would constitute a breach of contract, an infringement of his copy-
right and trademark rights, a violation of his moral rights under state law,
and a violation of his free speech and due process rights under the First
and Fifth Amendments.1 35 The district court dismissed Serra's case
against the GSA administrators in their individual capacities on the basis
of qualified immunity.' 36 In a later opinion, the district court dismissed
some of Serra's remaining claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and ruled that the constitutional claims lacked merit.1 37 Affirming, the
Second Circuit noted with regards to the free speech claim:
Notwithstanding that the sculpture is site-specific and
may lose its artistic value if relocated, Serra is free to
express his artistic and political views through the press
127 Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26 ("[T]he economic incentive for artistic and intellectual crea-
tion that serves as the foundation for American copyright law ... cannot be reconciled with the
inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the
public on which the artists are financially dependent.") (citations omitted).
128 Serra v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 664 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) [Serra
I], dismissed in part, 667 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) [Serra H].
129 Serra v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988) [Serra Ill].
130 Id. at 1046-47.
131 Id. at 1047.
132 Id. (quoting Richard Serra).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1048.
135 See Serra I, 664 F. Supp. at 801-02.
136 Id. at 807.
137 Serra II, 667 F. Supp. at 1057.
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and through other means that do not entail obstructing
the plaza.138
And regarding Serra's due process claim, the court wrote:
Moreover, though Serra might suffer injury to his repu-
tation as a result of relocation of the sculpture, such an
injury without accompanying loss of government em-
ployment would not constitute a constitutionally cogni-
zable deprivation of property or liberty.' 39
Ultimately, the GSA removed Tilted Arc in March 1989, hauling the
crafted material to "a federal motor pool yard." 140 The work effectively
ceased to exist.
Serra's lawyers advised him not to assert a moral rights claim be-
cause such rights were not recognized under American law at the time. 14
However, if moral rights legislation had existed, the circuit court's state-
ments, particularly the ones noted above, indicate that the court may
have been receptive to a claim that removing a site-specific work from its
context constitutes destruction in violation of an artist's integrity right.
II. THE UNITED STATES' STATUTORY APPROACH TO
MORAL RIGHTS: THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF VARA
Despite Congress' resistance to the moral rights doctrine, on March
1, 1989, the United States became a member of the international Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 142 The
Berne Convention explicitly recognizes the moral rights of attribution
and integrity in Article 6bis.143 The United States' decision to join the
Berne Convention was influenced by the fact that, at the time, seventy-
138 Serra III, 847 F.2d at 1050.
139 Id. at 1052.
140 See S.F. CHRON., Mar. 17, 1989, at E3 col. 1.
141 N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1989, at B2 col. 6.
142 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988).
143 See Berne Convention, supra note 48. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention states in
relevant part:
6bis.1. This Article, introduced into the Convention in Rome (1928), is an important
provision since it underlines that, in addition to any pecuniary or economic benefits,
copyright also includes rights of a moral kind. These stem from the fact that the
work is a reflection of the personality of its creator, just as the economic rights
reflect the author's need to keep body and soul together.
6bis.3. This provision enshrines two of the author's prerogatives: first and foremost,
to claim the paternity of his work-to assert that he is its creator. Usually he does so
by placing his name of the copies (title pages or fly leaves, Film subtitles, signatures
on pictures, sculpture). This right of paternity may be exercised by the author as he
wishes ... Under it, an author may refuse to have his name applied to a work that is
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six countries around the world were signatories, 44 and some legislators
believed that joining the Convention would enhance international protec-
tion of intellectual property by encouraging consensus on the rules of
authors' rights between the United States and its global trading and cul-
tural partners.145 Congressional supporters also anticipated that joining
the Convention would ensure the United States' leadership in interna-
tional trade and avoid copyright piracy of valuable United States innova-
tions and export commodities. 146
Congress mitigated concerns about the Convention's moral rights
provisions by adopting a "minimalist" approach to Berne.147 That is,
Congress maintained that the Berne Convention was not "self-executing"
and that "[tihe obligations of the United States under the Berne Conven-
tion may be performed only pursuant to appropriate domestic law."'148
Further, Congress justified its refusal to amend the Copyright Act to
comply with the Convention's moral rights provisions by noting that va-
rying United States laws already provided moral rights protection. 149 For
additional support, Congress referred to comments published by the
World Intellectual Property Organization, the Convention's administra-
tive entity, which suggested flexibility in complying with the treaty's
moral rights provisions. 50 Thus, the United States entered the Berne
Convention, and amended the Copyright Act accordingly, without en-
not his; nor can anyone filch the name of another by adding it to a work the latter
never created...
6bis.4. The second prerogative is that of objecting to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to the work which would
be prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation ...
6bis.6. Note that the moral right exists "independently from the author's economic
rights" and even "after transfer of the said rights." This protects the author against
himself and stops entrepreneurs from turning the moral right into an immoral one.
Id. at 41-42.
144 Berne Convention Hearings, supra note 86, at 41 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
145 Id. at 50-51 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
146 See id. at 50-51, 67, 70 (statements of Reps. Kastenmeier and Moorhead, and Sen.
Verity). According to Sen. Verity:
All over the world people enjoy our music, our movies, our videos, and our books
and magazines. They run their computers with our software. With these items, we
export not just our goods, but a large bit of our national character as well.
But much of this is in jeopardy.: Piracy remains a problem costing us well over $1
billion annually. Compulsory licensing or other forms of legalized blackmail can
lead to lost sales, lost markets, or loss of our technological edge.
Id. at 70.
147 See Gerald Dworkin, Moral Rights in Common Law Countries, in MORAL RIGHTS,
supra note 14, at 44 ("[I]n framing the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, the
dominating theme was a 'minimalist' approach: no changes wculd be made to United States
copyright law unless deemed to be absolutely necessary in order to comply with the Berne
Convention obligations.").
148 Berne Convention Implementation Act, supra note 142, § 2.
149 See Damich, supra note 9, at 945 (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 38 (1988)).
150 Id. at 945-46.
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larging or diminishing the rights that were already protected by state and
federal laws. 151
But, as those who opposed joining Berne had anticipated, ratifying
the treaty created fertile soil for the planting of American moral rights
law. A number of artists, politicians, and legal scholars disagreed that
existing law sufficiently protected moral rights, and petitioned Congress
to enact moral rights legislation. 152 Additional encouragement for
change came from the United Kingdom which, motivated by an effort to
comply with the Berne Convention, amended its copyright law to explic-
itly provide moral rights protection.1 53
As a result, in 1989 Representative Robert Kastenmeier introduced
House Bill 2690, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989, proposing to
protect artists' moral rights, to the House of Representatives and Senator
Edward Kennedy introduced a companion bill, Senate Resolution 1198,
to the Senate.' 54 Both bills proposed to grant the author of a work of
visual art the moral rights of attribution and integrity. Both aimed to
prevent individuals, including art owners, from mutilating or destroying
artworks by making individuals liable for such actions. 155
Despite earlier concerns over enacting moral rights legislation,1 56
Congress had become increasingly convinced of its necessity. That was
due, at least in part, to a number of art horror stories circulating at the
time.'5 7 For example, in hearings on Senate Resolution 1198, Senator
Markey recalled that two Australian entrepreneurs had chopped up Pablo
Picasso's Trois Femmes into 500 original Picasso pieces, then sold the
pieces individually.' 58 Without the protection of a moral rights statute,
the seminal cubist work was "brutally mutilated," and the artist's name
was "exploited for the financial gain of the two profiteers." 159 One attor-
ney testifying before the Senate subcommittee recounted a case in which
an artist had installed certain murals near a construction site and con-
struction workers cut the murals up, used some of the pieces as gates,
151 See Berne Convention Implementation Act, supra note 142, § 2.; see also Berne Con-
vention Hearings, supra note 86, at 41 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("[C]urrent copyright laws
and practices would not be altered now or in the future by implementation of Berne.").
152 See Damich, supra note 9, at n.5.
153 See Damich, supra note 9, at 946.
154 H.R. 2690, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 1198, 101st Cong. (1990).
155 See 135 CONG. REc. S. 6811 (daily ed. June 16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
156 See 135 CONG. REC. E. 2199 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier) (noting that related legislation had been introduced in the past with little success).
157 See 135 CONG. REc. S. 6811 (daily ed. June 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier) ("We have all heard the horror stories about paint being removed from sculpture,
murals painted over, paintings altered. We have to commit ourselves to the fundamental pre-
mise that even when an artist has sold his work he has the moral and legal right to see the
integrity of that work preserved."); see also WAIVER REPORT, supra note 75, at 6.
158 Moral Rights Hearings, supra note 76, at 25 (statement of Sen. Markey).
159 Id.
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and piled dirt on the others. 160 Tom Van Sant, an artist and founder of
the Los Angeles Mural Conservancy, recounted how one of his murals
was destroyed when the building it was installed in was sold: during
remodeling, the new owner tore down Van Sant's work without notifying
him.' 61 Stories like these convinced Congress that moral rights legisla-
tion, with provision for waiver of the rights, was necessary to protect the
visual arts in America.' 62 Accordingly, Congress passed House Bill
2690 and it became the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.163
B. AMENDMENT TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT TO REFLECT MORAL
RIGHTS: VARA
In enacting the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Congress
amended the United States Copyright Act' 64 to include the moral rights
of attribution and integrity for artists who create certain works included
in a narrowly defined category of visual art. 165 These rights, as codified
160 Id, at 109 (statement of Peter H. Karlen, Attorney, La Jolla, California).
161 See id. at 121-22 (statement of Tom Van Sant, artist, on behalf of the Artist Equity
Association, Santa Monica, California).
162 Due to concerns about the negative effect moral rights legislation would potentially
have on the art market, Congress decided that such legislation could not pass unless the artist
could waive her rights. See WAIVER REPORT, supra note 75, at 3. While S. 1198 did not
provide for waiver, H.R. 2690, which Congress ultimately adopted, did. Compare S. 1198,
101st Cong. (1990) with H.R. 2690, 101st Cong. (1989).
163 H.R. 2690 was amended to require one joint author who waives moral rights to have
waived the rights of coauthors in a joint work. See WAIVER REPORT, supra note 75, at 7. The
Senate was slower to pass S. 1198. On the last day of the 101st Congress, sponsors of a major
bill authorizing eighty-five new federal judgeships included the VARA proposal to appease
senators who would traditionally have opposed the addition of the federal judgeships. With
that compromise, the full Senate passed VARA. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art
Fares Post Vara, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997).
164 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000).
165 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines a work of visual art as:
1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures
of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature
or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in
a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
A work of visual art does not include-
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied
art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodi-
cal, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar
publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering,
or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
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in § 106A of the Copyright Act, endow an artist with the right to attribu-
tion, as well as the right to protect her work from being distorted, muti-
lated, modified and, in cases where the work is of recognized stature,
destroyed by others. 166 Thus, an art owner may not use the artwork she
purchased in any manner she wants, because changing it in a way that
results in a misrepresentation of the artist's conception renders the owner
liable under VARA.167 As with the civil law moral rights doctrine, rights
under VARA are personal to the artist and are distinct from the economic
rights of the copyright holder.168 Thus, the artist retains the rights of
attribution and integrity regardless of whether or not she is the copyright
holder. 169 Furthermore, the artist retains such rights even once she has
sold her work to another.170
While in the civil law doctrine, moral rights protection lasts at least
until the expiration of copyright, 171 VARA provides that an artist's moral
rights only endure for the artist's life. 172 Further, in another departure
from the traditional doctrine, VARA provides that an artist may waive
her moral rights in a signed written instrument that specifically identifies
the work covered by the waiver. 173 In addition, the artist waives her
rights when she signs a written instrument consenting to install a work in
a building and acknowledging that the work is installed in such a way
that removing the work would cause its distortion, mutilation or
destruction. ' 74
Id.
166 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B).
167 See Damich, supra note 9, at 949 ("The right of [integrity] is the author's right to
ensure that the work always authentically expresses his vision or concept."). Of course, there
are limitations to this rule. For example, an artist will not have a cause of action against an art
owner for hanging her painting in one corner as opposed to another. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(c)(2).
168 See Moral Rights Hearings, supra note 76, at 75-76 (statement of Sen. Grassley). See
also Kwall, supra note 163, at 1.
169 See Moral Rights Hearings, supra note 76, at 75-76 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
170 135 CONG. REc. S. 6811 (daily ed. July 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
171 The international Berne Convention treaty provides that an artist shall retain moral
rights, "after his death ... at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercis-
able by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection
is claimed." Berne Convention, supra note 48, at art. 6bis, 2, 43.
172 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(l)-(3). Copyright protection, on the other hand, generally
endures for the life of the author plus seventy years. See id. § 302(a).
173 See id. § 106A(e). Under French law, for example, moral rights cannot be waived.
See I.P. Code, supra note 41, Title II Ch. ler Art. L. 121-1 (Fr.). Most countries that recognize
moral rights do not allow for waiver. See generally MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 244-85.
174 See 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1).
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III. PREVENTING THE DESTRUCTION OF ARTWORK UNDER
VARA: PRELIMINARY HURDLES FOR ARTISTS
TO OVERCOME
A. WORK MUST NOT BE "MADE-FOR-HIRE"
Artists may rely on VARA to prevent the destruction of their work
only if they create the work as independent contractors. Under the Copy-
right Act, "A work of visual art does not include ... any work made for
hire."'175 Accordingly, an artist creating a work within the scope of her
employment does not have a right under VARA to prevent destruction of
that work.
In Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,176 three artists working as a collective
installed a sculpture in a building lobby pursuant to an agreement with
the building's then tenant.177 This "walkthrough" sculpture consisted of
recycled materials that were attached to the walls and ceiling, and a large
mosaic embedded in the walls and floor. 178 Upon assuming the building
lease, the building's new management company sought to remove the
artists' work. 179 The artists sued, claiming that removal would destroy
their artwork and thereby constitute a violation of their rights under
VARA.180 While the trial court determined that the artists had a valid
claim under VARA and issued a permanent injunction enjoining the re-
moval of the sculpture for the duration of the three artists' lifetimes, 8"
the Second Circuit reversed, finding that the sculpture was a work made
for hire and, therefore, not protected under VARA.182
Courts apply a common law agency test to determine whether an
artist is an employee of her patron. A number of factors are relevant to
that inquiry, including the right to control the manner and means of pro-
duction; requisite skill; provision of employee benefits; tax treatment of
the hired party; and whether the hired party may be assigned additional
175 17 U.S.C. § 101. Under the statute, a work made for hire is "a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of her employment." Id.
176 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) [Carter I], rev'd and vacated in part and affd
in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1208 (1996) [Carter II].
177 Carter 11, 71 F.3d at 80.
t78 Id.
179 Id. at 81.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 85. While both the district court and the circuit court applied a multi-factor
balancing test, to determine the meanings of the Copyright Act terms "employee" and "scope
of employment," the circuit court determined that the district court's factual findings were
clearly erroneous. Id. The circuit court's decision was most influenced by the fact that the
original tenant afforded the artists employment benefits, a weekly salary, and particularized tax
treatment, all of which "strongly" suggested an employer-employee relationship. Id. at 86-87.
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projects. 183 If the relationship between the artist and the patron satisfies
those factors, the court will deem the artist an employee ineligible to
assert the right of integrity to prevent destruction under VARA.184 How-
ever, determining whether an artist is an employee rather than an inde-
pendent contractor is a fact-specific inquiry, and "future cases involving
the work for hire question will not always fit neatly into an employee or
independent contractor category." 185
B. WORK MUST BE OF "RECOGNIZED STATURE"
Section 106A(a)(3)(B) of the Copyright Act provides that the author
of a visual work of art has the right to "prevent any destruction of a work
of recognized stature." 186 Therefore, before a court will consider
whether removing the work from its site constitutes a destruction of the
art in violation of VARA, the artist must show, as a threshold matter, that
her work is of "recognized stature." Although VARA does not define
the phrase "recognized stature," both Senate Resolution 1198 and House
Bill 2690 propose that a court should take into account "the opinions of
artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, conser-
vators, and other persons involved with the creation, appreciation, his-
tory, or marketing of works of visual art."'187 The recognized stature
requirement acknowledges that society could suffer a significant loss
when art that is recognized by other artists, art experts, or the community
at large, is completely destroyed.188
The district court in Carter set forth a two-part test to determine
what constitutes an artwork of recognized stature under § 106A(a)(3)(B)
of the Copyright Act.189 First, the art in question has stature if it is
viewed as "meritorious."'190 Second, the stature must be "recognized" by
"art experts, other members of the artistic community, or by some cross
section of society," which will generally require the artist to rely on ex-
pert testimony.' 9 ' To make such a showing, the court explained, "[a]
plaintiff need not demonstrate that his or her artwork is equal in stature
to that created by artists such as Picasso, Chagall, or Giacometti."' 192
183 See id. at 85 (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
751-52 (1989), which set forth thirteen specific factors, drawn from common law agency, to
consider when determining work-for-hire inquiry).
184 As was the case, for example, in Carter. See Carter, supra note 176.
185 Carter I1, 71 F.3d at 87.
186 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). For a compelling critique of the recognized stature re-
quirement under VARA, see Kwall, supra note 163, at 14-15.
187 S. 1198, 101st Cong. (1990); H.R. 2690, 101st Cong. (1989).
188 Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. at 324-25.
189 See id. at 325.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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Site-specific artworks installed in public spaces, such as John Sny-
der's Silent City, would seem to satisfy the recognized stature require-
ment as interpreted by the district court in Carter. That is, public officials
offer commissions either to already distinguished artists ("recognized by
art experts, etc." prong) or to competition winners who, in the course of
their victories, enjoy much publicity such that their proposed works ele-
vate to the level of recognized stature ("meritorious" prong).1 93 Thus,
whether a government entity chooses an artist to design a site-specific
work based on past achievement or on a competition entry does not ne-
gate the artwork's recognized stature, as an artist who wins a competition
to design for a community space generally receives a great deal of pub-
licity following her victory.
C. ARTIST MUST NOT HAVE WAIVED MORAL RIGHTS
Before an artist can assert her integrity right under VARA to pre-
vent the destruction of her artwork, she must make sure that she does not
waive her moral rights in a written contract. While most countries that
recognize moral rights prohibit waiver, and would consider such a provi-
sion in a contract null and void, VARA explicitly permits artists to waive
moral rights.' 94 As a result, in America, patrons with leveraged bargain-
ing power are often able to circumvent the moral rights doctrine.
There are two waiver provisions under VARA. The first waiver is
codified in § 106A(e)(1) of the Copyright Act, and provides that an artist
may waive moral rights if she explicitly consents to such a waiver in a
written agreement that she signs. 195 The agreement must specifically
identify that the waiver applies to the work, and must clearly define the
use of that work. 196 The clause also notes that, with co-authored works,
one author's waiver suffices to waive the moral rights of all authors. 197
The second waiver is codified in § 113(d) of the Copyright Act, and
pertains to works installed in buildings. That clause provides for a
waiver of rights when an artist installs a work in a building in such a way
that removing the work would physically harm it in a manner generally
prohibited under VARA.198 The waiver is only effective if: (1) the artist
installed the work prior to VARA taking effect; or (2) if the artist and
building owner sign a written agreement, which explicitly states that in-
stallation may subject the work to such physical harm if the owner
chooses to remove the work. 199 Though, if the owner is able to remove
193 See id. at 325.
194 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(l)-(3).
195 § 106A(e)(1).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1).
199 § i 13(d)(l)(B).
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the work without physically harming it, the artist retains her moral rights
under VARA unless the owner makes an unsuccessful good faith attempt
to notify the artist of the removal, or the owner provided notice and the
artist failed to remove the work or pay for its removal within 90 days of
receiving such notice.200
Patrons will often include a waiver-of-moral-rights clause in the
written agreement that they present to artists when negotiating a commis-
sion. Generally, particularly when dealing with a government agency,
the contracts are recycled standard form agreements. The alluring mag-
nitude of such commissions combined with the considerably leveraged
bargaining power of the patron often makes it difficult for artists to avoid
waiving their rights in order to secure the commission. 20 1
Artists who waive their moral rights in a written agreement with the
art owner may not rely on the statute to prevent the destruction of their
artwork. Due to concerns about the negative effect moral rights legisla-
tion could have on the art market, Congress decided that this legislation
could not pass unless the artist could waive her rights. 202 To allay its
concerns about reconciling non-economic moral rights with United
States copyright law, Congress determined that a VARA provision that
would allow artists to waive the rights of attribution and integrity would
provide effective balance of moral and economic rights.203
200 Id. § 113(d)(2).
201 Members of Congress who opposed the waiver provisions remained concerned that an
imbalance in bargaining power between the artist and the commissioning party would "force
authors to sign waivers of 106A rights if waiver were available, and render the grant of moral
rights meaningless in the real world." WAIVER REPORT, supra note 75, at 27. To address that
concern, upon enacting VARA, Congress mandated that the Register of Copyrights study the
extent and circumstances under which artists have waived their moral rights, and submit a final
report on the effects of the waiver provision no later than five years after VARA's enactment.
See Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 608(2), 104 Stat. 5128 (1990). Accordingly, in March 1996 the
Register of Copyrights issued a Final Report on the effect of the waiver provisions. See gener-
ally id.
In light of testimony offered by artists, art experts, scholars, and attorneys, the report
concluded that the waiver contained in § 113(d) for works installed in buildings was favorable
to prevent artwork from rendering real estate inalienable, but allowing for waiver for "movable
works"-i.e., paintings, free-standing sculptures, etc.-may not be desirable due to artists'
general unfamiliarity with VARA, and limited bargaining power making it easy for patrons to
coax artists into waiving rights that they may not want to waive if they fully understood the
implications of their actions. See id. at 158-59.
Nonetheless, the Register of Copyrights concluded that, due to inconclusive evidence on
whether removing the waiver provision for movable art would strengthen artists' bargaining
power, no legislative amendment to eliminate that waiver was necessary at that time. See id. at
190-91.
202 See WAIVER REPORT, supra note 75, at i. While S. 1198 did not provide for waiver,
H.R. 2690, which Congress ultimately adopted, did.
203 Id. at 27.
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IV. VARA AND SITE-SPECIFIC ARTWORK: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND A PROPOSAL
FOR AMENDMENTS
A. THE AMBIGUOUS STATE OF SITE-SPECIFIC ARTWORK UNDER
VARA
While VARA mandates that an artist who creates a visual work of
art 204 has the moral right to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation,
modification, and, in some cases, destruction of her work, it is not clear
from the statute or relevant case law whether VARA recognizes an art-
ist's moral right to prevent her site-specific artwork from being removed
without physical damage. Since site-specific artwork is designed for a
particular place, it is inherently dependant on its context. Thus, site-spe-
cific art can be considered a combination of a readymade work and a
crafted work: the site is the readymade work, from which the artist draws
her inspiration, and upon which the artist adds a crafted material. To-
gether, the readymade and the crafted material exist as the artwork. If
the readymade site is stripped of the crafted material, the art ceases to
exist-that is, it is destroyed-despite the fact that the crafted part of the
piece may remain intact at another location. As discussed above, this
sort of "conceptual destruction" is not explicitly contemplated by VARA.
Instead, the statute only prohibits "any destruction," and does not further
define what constitutes such destruction.205 Thus, the question of
whether an artist has the moral right to prevent her site-specific work
from being conceptually destroyed is left to judicial interpretation of
what constitutes "destruction" of an artwork. To date, courts have only
applied VARA to matters involving actual physical destruction. 20 6
Further complicating the issue is the fact that national, state, and
local governments often commission artists to create these works for
public spaces like plazas and national parks. 207 Under the moral rights
doctrine, the result of these commissions is that government-owned
spaces are transformed into works of art. If VARA were to give the
204 A "visual work of art" is defined in § 101 of the Copyright Act, and includes paint-
ings, drawings, prints, and sculptures. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1). For statutory text, see supra note
165.
205 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (stating that "the author of a work of visual art shall have
the right.., to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right." (emphasis added)).
206 See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625 (S.D. Ind. 1997), modified by 4 F.
Supp. 2d 808 (S.D. Ind. 1998), affd 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999); Carter 1, 861 F. Supp. 303;
Carter If, 71 F.3d 77.
207 For example, the General Services Administration of the Federal Government (GSA)
commissioned sculptor Richard Serra to design a work for Foley Square in Manhattan, and
architect and artist Maya Lin was commissioned to design a monument for the Mall in Wash-
ington, D.C.
2001] REMOVAL OF SITE-SPECIFIC ARTWORK
artist the right to prevent the conceptual destruction of her artwork, in
spite of her lack of actual ownership, the artist could constrain the use of
the public-owned space. Government officials would be liable for re-
moving the artwork even if such removal were in the public's interest.
While § 113 of the Copyright Act provides for the waiver of moral rights
when an artist agrees to install a work in a building, 208 the Copyright Act
contains no like provision regarding the installation of site-specific art,
despite suggestions offered in the course of the congressional hearings on
VARA.20 9
B. COURTS MUST CONSIDER SITE-SPECIFIC ARTWORK CONCEPTUALLY
DESTROYED WHEN IT IS REMOVED FROM ITS CONTEXT
Following the removal of Tilted Arc from Foley Square in Manhat-
tan, but before Congress enacted VARA, Richard Serra refused commis-
sions to create site-specific sculptures when the patron would not
contractually guarantee the integrity of the work.210 Prior to the enact-
ment of VARA, he specifically complained that the right of property in
the United States wrongfully trumped other important rights in artwork
including the right to protect one's own creations. 211 In 1989, he explic-
itly called for moral rights legislation, asserting that:
Such coverage now exists in every other civilized coun-
try in the world. In the U.S., this new rule would ac-
208 17 U.S.C. § 113(d) does not apply to movable artworks such as paintings or sculptures
that can easily be transported from one location to another. See also WAIVER REPORT, supra
note 75, at 158-59. For additional discussion on the effects of waiver under VARA, see dis-
cussion infra Part III.C.
209 Some did propose to include a waiver for public installations, though the ultimate draft
of § 113(d) excludes mention of such works. See Moral Rights Hearings, supra note 76, at
117 (statement of Peter H. Karlan, Attorney, La Jolla, California). Karlan proposed that the
following language be included in VARA:
Where a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of a building or
public structure in such a way that removing the work from the building or public
structure will cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of
the work . . . and the author ... consented to the installation of the work in the
building or public structure in a written instrument signed by the owner of the build-
ing or public structure ... then the rights conferred by ... section 106A shall not
apply, except as may otherwise be agreed by written instrument signed by such
owner and the author ....
Id. at 117 (emphasis added). Karlan goes onto describe a "public structure" as:
[Any bridge, aqueduct, or other public edifice either owned or operated by the
United States Government, a State, a political subdivision thereof, or any govern-
ment agency therein, or erected on land owned by the United States Government, a
state, a 'political subdivision thereof, or any governmental Agency therein.
Id. at 118.
210 See Patricia Failing, An Unsitely Mess, ARTNEws, Oct. 1994, at 151 (discussing
Serra's withdrawal of his plans for a site-specific sculpture for the Fine Arts Museum of San
Francisco).
211 See Richard Serra, 'Tilted Arc' Destroyed, ART IN AMERICA, May 1989, at 43.
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knowledge a relationship between an artist and his work
even after the work had been sold . . .This legislation
would allow the artist ... to sue to reverse or redress the
alteration of any art work.212
Although Congress has since enacted VARA, it is not clear whether
a court would interpret the statute to protect against the sort of concep-
tual destruction that befell Tilted Arc. The issue of whether removing
site-specific art from its context constitutes destruction in violation of the
artist's moral rights under VARA has not been squarely before a court.
As discussed above, post-VARA cases dealing with destruction of art-
work have involved only actual physical destruction. Yet while the
courts have yet to test the degree of protection afforded to site-specific
artists under VARA,21 3 artists, critics, and legal scholars lend support to
212 Id.
213 One case that has taken a pass at the issue is English v. BFC&R E. 11 th St., L.L.C.,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19137. In that case, the court intimated that artists could not prevent
the conceptual destruction of their art under VARA. The case did not deal with government-
commissioned site-specific installations.
In English, six artists created artwork in a community garden, which consisted of five
murals and six sculptures. Id. at *2. The artists sued the New York City Partnership Housing
Development Fund and developers BFC&R E. 1 lth Street LLC when the latter planned to
erect a building on the land where the art was located. Id. at *3. Because the artists placed
pieces on the site without the permission of the city, the court ruled that they were not pro-
tected by VARA, reasoning that artists "could not effectively freeze development of vacant
lots by placing artwork there without permission." Id. at *11.
The court further noted that, even if the artists had permission to install the sculptures in
the garden, removing them would not constitute a violation of VARA because § 106A(c)(2) of
the Copyright Act excluded placement or display from the definition of destruction, distortion,
mutilation or modification. Id. at * 14. The court referred to the legislative history of VARA,
which states: "removal of a work from a specific location comes within [this] exclusion...
because the location is a matter of presentation." Id. at *15 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-514
(1990)). The court further concluded that erecting a building on the site would not destroy the
murals, but would simply obstruct people from viewing them. Id. at * 16. This sort of ob-
struction, the court concluded, is not actionable under VARA. Id.
There are two significant problems with the reasoning in English. First, the court takes a
simplistic approach in its reading of § 106A(c)(2). That section states that "the modification of
a work of visual art which is the result of conservation, or of the public presentation, including
lighting and placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation or other modifi-
cation described in subsection (a)(3) unless the modification is caused by gross negligence."
17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (emphasis added). The language of that clause is plainly directed at
protecting art owners, museums or galleries from liability based on moral rights claims by
artists who disapprove of how a painting is hung, where a sculpture is placed, or what color
light shines on their work. See, e.g. Moral Rights Hearings, supra note 76, at 134 (statement of
Marc F. Wilson, Director, Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art, expressing concern about the effects
the moral right of integrity would have on the display of art).
For example, in testifying before the subcommittee on patents, copyrights and trade-
marks, Marc Wilson, Director of the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art, expressed his concern
about the effects the moral right of integrity would have on display. See Moral Rights Hear-
ings, supra note 76, at 134 (statement of Marc F. Wilson, Director, Nelson-Atkins Museum of
Art, Kansas City, Mo.). Specifically, Wilson was concerned with the word 'distortion:' "This
term might be so extended as to apply to the manner of installation or framing of an art work
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the proposition that removing site-specific work from its context consti-
tutes a destruction of the art.
A number of artists and critics have noted that the site is an integral
component of the entire site-specific artwork, as opposed to a mere stage
for presentation, supporting the argument that removing the crafted mate-
rial from the site destroys the art. For example, critic Douglas Crimp
writes about the interdependent relationship between object and context
in site-specific work. 214 In his discussion of Richard Serra's Strike, an
installation consisting of a steel plate bisecting a comer of the Lo Gi-
udice Gallery in New York from 1969-71, Crimp explains:
That steel plate was not, however, the work. To become
the sculpture Strike, the steel plate had to occupy a site
to assume its position wedged into the comer of the gal-
lery room, bisecting the right angle where wall met
wall . . . The place where the sculpture would stand
would be the place where it was made...215
The term "site-specific" is sort of a catchall phrase for a variety of
artworks that elevate, in varying degrees, the importance of the relation-
ship between context and object. For example, artist Maya Lin has
noted, "I don't design pure objects ... I work with the landscape, and I
in an exhibition setting, or even the color of the wall in the gallery containing the work." Id.
While neither the House nor Senate bills originally proposed to include a clause stating that
"public presentation, including lighting and placement," did not constitute a violation of moral
rights, Congress ultimately included such a clause in VARA in response to concerns like those
expressed by Marc Wilson. H.R. 2690, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 1198, 101st Cong. (1990).
Furthermore, legislative history indicates that removal of a work from a display location
comes within the § 106A(c)(2) exception because its location is a matter of presentation. 17
U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2). This merely serves to emphasize the point that an artist cannot prevent a
museum or gallery from hanging her work on one wall as opposed to another, but the provi-
sion does not contemplate works specifically created for the site in which they are installed.
See id. In fact, there is nothing in the congressional hearings on either S. 1198 or H.R. 2690 to
suggest that this exception is aimed at anything other than 'display' which is wholly separate
from works that are created as part of a site. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514 (1990).
The second problem with the court's reasoning in English is that the court refuses to
consider the artistic value of the artwork in question by failing to recognize that the murals
would be destroyed if a building were erected in a way that prevented people from seeing the
art. It is difficult to dispute the point that murals that are painted on buildings are put there for
others to see. If a work of art is not physically destroyed, but still cannot be seen, it might as
well not exist. Art is usually created with the spectator in mind. To argue that a mural would
not be destroyed when it is permanently sealed from sight by the side of a building is akin to
arguing that one could still enjoy the view from a window that was similarly blocked. In both
situations, the form of the thing is meaningless when it is stripped of its function.
214 DOUGLAS CRIMP, ON THE MUSEUM'S RUINS 150-86 (3d ed. 1997). Crimp provides a
comprehensive discussion of the nature of site-specific art, and how removing crafted material
from its intended context destroys the artwork. Id.
215 Id. at 159.
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hope that the object and the land are equal players. '216 Yet other
artworks that are site-specific, perhaps in the fullest-extent of the term,
such as earthworks by Robert Smithson, 217 Andy Goldsworthy, 2t 8 and
Richard Long,219 are completely inextricable from their sites because
they are literally made from and imbedded in nature. For other artists,
the object is even secondary to the context-a mere tool devised to
orchestrate a certain behavioral relationship between the spectator and a
particular space. As artist Richard Serra has explained, "I am interested
in behavioral space in which the viewer interacts with the sculpture in its
context." 220 Accordingly, certain site-specific art is not only dependant
on a particular space, but on social, political, and psychological space as
defined by the viewers of the art. 22 1 Regardless of the degree of inti-
macy between object and space, as one scholar has noted, "[site-specific]
works elaborate the landscape: the landscape reveals the works.
They ... provide a focused experience of place. '222
Artist and critic Brian O'Doherty offers a comprehensive discussion
of the important role of context in site-specific work in his book Inside
216 Elizabeth Hess, A Tale of Two Memorials, ART IN AMERICA, Apr. 1983, at 123 (inter-
view with Maya Lin).
217 Perhaps Smithson's most notable work is Spiral Jetty (1970). The work is a coil made
from mud, rocks, and salt crystals. It is 1500 feet long and 15 feet wide, and extends from the
shore at Rozel Point into Great Salt Lake in Utah. The DIA Center for the Arts acquired the
work from Smithson's estate in 1999. It remains submerged beneath water at its original site
in Utah. For a comprehensive resource on Robert Smithson, see generally http://
www.robertsmithson.com (n.d.).
218 Examples of Goldsworthy's work include Knotweed Stalks Pushed into Lake Bottom
(February 20 and March 8-9, 1988), installed in Derwent Water, Cumbria, and Storm King
Wall (1997-98), installed in Storm King Art Center, New York. Goldsworthy created both
works exclusively using materials indigenous to the respective sites. For images of Gold-
sworthy's works, see http://www.getty.edu/artsednet/resources/Scope/Assignments/sam-
plela.html (n.d.), and http://www.stormkingartcenter.org/AndyGoldsworthy.html (n.d.).
219 Since 1967, Long has been making what he calls "map works" by walking through a
landscape. In his first of such walks, he traversed a straight line through a grassy field leaving
behind the imprint-of his tracks. For more on Richard Long, see http://www.richardlong.com
(n.d.).
220 Patricia Phillips, Forum: Something There Is That Doesn't Love: A Wall, 23
ARTFORUM INTERNATIONAL, Summer 1985, at 101 (quoting Richard Serra).
221 See, e.g., Richard Serra, supra note 211, at 41 ("The preliminary analysis of a given
site takes into consideration not only formal but also social and political characteristics of the
site. Site-specific works invariably manifest a value judgment about the larger social and
political context of which they are part."); Phillips, supra note 220, at 100 (" 'Site' is a shifting
compound of physical qualities and phenomena; it is also a psychological domain layered with
perceptions and associations, individual dreams and shared mythologies. It is what people
bring to it..."); Germano Celant, Bonds Between Art and Architecture, in ANDRE, BRUEN,
IRWIN, NORDMAN: SPACE AS SUPPORT I I (Mark Rosenthal ed., 1980) ("The distinctions made
in the relationships between social structure and art are reflected in the concrete, not the theo-
retical-literary, relationships between art and the social, physical environment.").
222 Phillips, supra note 220, at 101 (quoting art scholar John Beardsley).
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the White Cube.223 He too emphasizes that site-specific artists are inter-
ested in orchestrating relationships between the object, its surrounding
spaces, and the viewers. 224 It is those relationships, not the objects in
and of themselves, that exist as the art.225 He also addresses the role of
context in his own artwork. Specifically, O'Doherty creates what he
calls "rope drawings," which are three-dimensional illustrations rendered
with colored ropes. The spectator walks through the art, as opposed to
looking at it. O'Doherty does not conceive of his idea for the drawings
until he sees the particular space he will be working in; thus no two rope
drawings are the same. Once the ropes are removed from the site, the
artwork ceases to exist. Since the rope drawing is so dependent on the
particular space, it would be impossible to precisely recreate it at another
location.226
Artists and art critics have considered the nature of site-specific art
since the 1960s.227 Its derivation can be traced to incentives to de-
comodify art and lift it from the sterile context of the museum space. 228
However, critic Germano Celant traces the important relationship be-
tween the object and its context in site-specific work to the early twenti-
eth century:
The awareness that each ... piece hinged on its belong-
ing to a context, and on the osmosis of context with
piece, persisted and became stronger at the beginning of
this [the twentieth] century. From Futurism and, more
evidently, from Dadaism to today, we can assert that the
meaning and value of the artistic action is determined by
its placement in an environmental specific. 229
223 BRIAN O'DOHERTY, INSIDE THE WHITE CUBE: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE GALLERY SPACE
(2d ed. 1986). While O'Doherty's entire book is applicable to an analysis of site-specific art,
Chapter II, "Context as Content" is particularly relevant. Id. at 65-106.
224 See generally O'DOHERTY, supra note 223 (discussing transformed relationships
among the space, object and viewer in various artworks created since the early 1970s).
225 See id.
226 Brian O'Doherty uses the working name Patrick Ireland. For further discussion on
O'Doherty's rope drawings, see, e.g., KENNETH BAKER ET AL., ROPE DRAWINGS, 1980-90
(1992). For images of O'Doherty's rope drawings, see http://www.charlescowlesgallery.com/
ireland.html (n.d.). For a comprehensive list of O'Doherty's installations, see http://
www.charlescowlesgallery.com/biorgaphies/IRELANDbio.htm (n.d.).
227 See Mark Rosenthal, Space as Support, in ANDRE, BRUEN, IRWIN AND NORDMAN:
SPACE AS SUPPORT 4 (Mark Rosenthal ed., 1980) ("[W]orks done for specific places-that is,
'site-specific, 'factual,' or in situ works-appeared about 1968.").
228 See generally, Lucy LIPPARD, SIX YEARS: THE DEMATERIALIZATION OF THE ART OB-
JECT (1973) (chronicling the conceptual, or "idea art," movement, beginning in the late 1960s,
during which many artists began to dislodge art objects from the museum space and conceive
of works for alternative contexts). See also Celant, supra note 221, at 12.
229 Celant, supra note 221, at 11.
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In the eighties, questions about the nature of site-specific art leapt
from academic circles to the center of well-publicized government con-
troversies. Both Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial and Richard
Serra's Tilted Arc stirred discussion of the importance of the relationship
between site-specific art and its context. Lin's plans to build a site-spe-
cific memorial on the Washington Mall became the center of dispute on
Capitol Hill in 1981, after she had been selected from a pool of over
1400 artist applicants. 230 The sculpture is comprised of two black gran-
ite walls that meet at a 125 degree angle. Lin designed the walls, which
rise from ground level on either end to ten feet at the apex, specifically
for a rise in the land such that the viewer cannot see the back of the
walls. 23 1 Those who opposed the monument, and tried to block its instal-
lation, complained that its sinking placement in the land symbolized anti-
war sentiment.232 While opponents were unsuccessful in their campaign
to block Lin's sculpture, they were able to commission a second artist,
Frederick Hart, to design a figurative memorial to their liking that would
be incorporated on the same site.233 Lin protested that the inclusion of
Hart's memorial would alter the context, and, therefore, her work. In a
1982 hearing before the Congressional Commission on Fine Arts, Lin
explained:
The original design gives each individual the freedom to
reflect upon the heroism and sacrifice of those who
served. It is not a memorial to politics or war, or contro-
versy, but to all those men and women who served. It
weaves the individual with the freedom of reflection and
contemplation at a place where he is at once part of the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial and a part of our memorial-
ized history. These intrusions [Hart's sculpture] which
treat the original work of art as no more than an architec-
tural backdrop, reflect an insensitivity to the original de-
sign's subtle spatial eloquence. And the statues, nearly
eight feet tall, are taller than most of the wall for most of
its length. These intrusions rip apart the meeting of
names, destroying the meaning of the design. I am not
approving or disapproving of the sculpture per se. I dis-
approve of the forced melding of these two different me-
morials into one memorial. 234
230 Hess, supra note 216, at 122.
231 Id. at 122.
232 Id. at 125.
233 Id.
234 MAYA LIN: A STRONG CLEAR VISION (American Film Foundation 1994) (1982 state-
ment of Maya Lin to the Cong. Commission on Fine Arts).
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Nonetheless, Hart's work was installed in 1984, a matter of feet from
Lin's memorial. 235
During the course of a lengthy debate regarding Richard Serra's
Tilted Arc, culminating in the court case discussed in Part I above, the
artist unremittingly expressed the importance of context in a site-specific
artwork. Serra offers a comprehensive explanation of the nature of site-
specific artwork:
Site-specific works deal with the environment compo-
nents of given places. The scale, size, and location of
site-specific works are determined by the topography of
the site, whether it be urban or landscape or architectural
enclosure. The works become part of the site and
restructure both conceptually and perceptually the organ-
ization of the site. My works never decorate, illustrate,
or depict a site.
The specificity of site-oriented works means that they
are conceived for, dependent upon and inseparable from
their location. Scale, size and placement of sculptural
elements result from an analysis of the particular envi-
ronmental components of a given context ... Based on
the inter-dependence of work and site, site-specific
works address the content and context of their site criti-
cally. A new behavioral and perceptual orientation to a
site demands a new critical adjustment to one's experi-
ence of the place. Site-specific works primarily engen-
der a dialogue with their surroundings. 236
Serra maintains that, because of its nature, the removal of his site-
specific work was tantamount to its destruction: "'To remove the work is
to destroy the work.' This has been accomplished; Tilted Arc is
destroyed." 237
Despite varying opinions on whether the government should have
removed Tilted Arc from its site, 238 many artists and critics have agreed
that the work was inherently dependant on its context. For example, art
historian and critic Patricia Phillips notes, "Few can argue that [Tilted
Arc] is not site-specific. '239 Artist Donald Judd has argued, "[there is] a
need to revive a secular version of sacrilege to categorize the attempt to
235 See http://vietnam-veterans-memorial.visit-washington-dc.com/ (n.d.).
236 Serra, supra note 211, at 41.
237 Id. at 35 (quoting himself).
238 At the public hearings on the proposed removal of Tilted Arc, fifty-eight people,
mostly government employees, testified in favor of removing the work, while 122 people
testified against removing the work. See id. at 36.
239 Phillips, supra note 220, at 101.
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destroy [Tilted Arc] ... Art is not to be destroyed, either old or new ....
Those who want to ruin Serra's work are barbarians. ' 240 Similarly, artist
Frank Stella has said: "To destroy [Tilted Arc] and simultaneously incur
greater public expense in that effort would disturb the status quo for no
gain. Furthermore, the precedent set would only have wasteful, unneces-
sary consequences."'241 Philosophy professor Gregg M. Horowitz ex-
plains how removing Tilted Arc annihilated the work: "Because Tilted
Arc was designed specifically for, and so in part derived its identity from,
its site, its expulsion from Federal Plaza was at the same time its
destruction." 242
Even beyond the scope of the Tilted Arc controversy, art critics have
discussed how removing a site-specific work from its context results in
conceptual destruction. For example, critic Germano Celant writes:
This unchanging nature [of site-specific work] results in
a unity integrated to the structure, and it does not lend
itself to manipulations; the work is thus not allowed to
be defined by environmental reasons other than those in-
teracting with the given or chosen space.
Art which binds itself to the context tends not to undergo
successive metamorphoses. It has the characteristic of a
realized praxis and it cannot be acted upon by others. 243
Legal scholars lend further credence to the argument that removing
a site-specific work from its context, even without damage to the object
the artist creates, constitutes conceptual destruction. In his book, Law
Ethics, and the Visual Arts, written before the enactment of VARA, Stan-
ford Law School Professor John Merryman discusses the removal of one
of artist Elio Benvenuto's site-specific sculptures.2 44 Santa Clara County
in California had commissioned Benvenuto to create and install a foun-
tain in the county government center courtyard. 245 When the courtyard
was renovated, the fountain was relocated to a storage facility, though it
was not physically destroyed. 246 Professor Merryman quoted one San
Francisco reporter who described the scene of the abandoned sculpture:
"'It leans at a crazy angle, its mass crushing an old tire as it dies an
240 Elizabeth Garber, Teaching Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Richard Serra: The Case of
Tilted Arc, available at http://www.arts.arizona.edu/are476/files/tiltedarc.htm (quoting Don-
ald Judd) (last modified Oct. 23, 2001).
241 Id. (quoting Frank Stella).
242 Gregg M. Horowitz, Public Art/Public Space: The Spectacle of the Tilted Arc Contro-
versy, J. AEsTHErics & ART CRMCISM, Winter 1996, at 8.
243 Celant, supra note 221, at 12.
244 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHics AND THE VisuAL ARTS 157 (2d ed. 1987).
245 Id.
246 Id.
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ignominious death of decay and tarnish.' ,,247 Professor Merryman re-
counts this incident under a heading he titles: "Abuse of Publicly Funded
Works: Some Horrible Examples.
248
DePaul College of Law Professor Roberta Kwall defines the moral
right of integrity as an artist's right to prevent another from destroying
the "spirit and character" of a work.249 According to Professor Kwall,
"any distortion that misrepresents an artist's expression" violates the art-
ist's moral rights.250 In discussing whether removing site-specific work
and placing it in an "objectionable context" constitutes a violation of an
artist's moral rights, Kwall states: "[A] creator who can prove that an
owner's display of his work will prejudice his honor and reputation
should be able to enjoin display. ' 251 Additionally, Law Professor Ma-
rina Santilli, of the University of Pisa in Italy, has explicitly noted, "the
removal of works designed for a particular environment might, under
VARA, be regarded as (symbolic) destruction of the work. 252
It is clear that the community of respected American artists and art
authorities regard the crafted work and the site of site-specific artworks
as an indivisible whole. The artists who create these works explain that
the meaning and purpose behind the art lie squarely within its physical
location. They are clear that relocation of the work destroys its meaning
and purpose, effectively obliterating its existence. Further, in France-
the birthplace of the moral rights doctrine-courts have long recognized,
that altering the context of an artwork in a manner that substantially
changes the work constitutes a violation of the artist's moral rights.
French case law supports the contention that removing site-specific work
from its context destroys the art. The weight, therefore, of both contem-
porary American art and legal authority in addition to French legal au-
thority support the proposition that removing site-specific work from its
context, even without physical damage, conceptually destroys the work.
American courts must determine that site-specific artists have a moral
right of integrity under VARA to prevent the removal of their works
from their contexts.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Roberta Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?,
38 VAND. L. RFv. 1, 8 (1985).
250 Id. at 8-9.
251 Id. at 95-96.
252 Santilli, supra note 52, at 101.
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C. CONGRESS MUST AMEND VARA TO INCLUDE A WAIVER CLAUSE
FOR GOVERNMENT-COMMISSIONED SITE-SPECIFIC ARTWORK
The public has an interest in the existence of muse-
ums, but it also has an interest in not having all of its
open spaces treated as though they were museums, in
which esthetic [i.e. private] interests rightly dominate.
-Arthur C. Danto, philosopher and art critic 253
Because a court should find that removing site-specific artwork
from its context destroys the work and therefore violates the artist's
moral rights Under VARA, Congress should amend VARA to include a
waiver clause, similar to § 113(d) of the Copyright Act, for site-specific
artwork. 254 The waiver clause would provide that when an artist agrees
in writing to install a work for a specific public space, and acknowledges
that its removal would effectuate either its conceptual or physical de-
struction, the artist does not have a moral right to prevent such removal
under VARA. Congress should include such a waiver clause for two
reasons: (1) to eliminate the potential for artists to bind public-owned
land for the durations of their lives, regardless of the public's interest in
removing the artist's work; and (2) to prevent discouraged patrons from
declining to commission such works which could, in turn, lead to sub-
stantial decline in commercial opportunities for artists.
Because site-specific artwork is comprised of crafted material and
site, the waiver provision must reflect the compound nature of the art by
addressing both the artist's moral right to protect the integrity of her en-
tire work, as well as the integrity of her crafted material. For example, if
the City of Ithaca were to remove John Snyder's Silent City from the
Route 96 Bridge and place the aluminum towers in a storage facility
without physically harming them, the removal would constitute a con-
ceptual destruction of Snyder's work in violation of the artist's integrity
right under VARA. But if the City of Ithaca were to remove Silent City
from its context in a manner that tore apart the aluminum towers, such
physical destruction would also violate the artist's integrity right-result-
ing in a two-fold infraction. To address the possibility of dual destruc-
tion, the artist must waive her moral rights to prevent both actual and
conceptual destruction. Accordingly, a waiver provision for site-specific
art cannot be conveniently accomplished by including site-specific instal-
lations within the installations-in-buildings waiver under the current
§ 113(d). Instead, Congress must draft a completely new waiver provi-
sion, or fully rewrite § 113(d), to specifically accommodate the unique
nature of site-specific work.
253 ARTHUR DANTO, THE STATE OF THE ART 93 (1987).
254 17 U.S.C. § 113(d).
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As in § 113(d), a waiver for site-specific artwork would provide that
an artist who agrees in writing to install a such a work in a public space,
and specifies that installation may subject the work to conceptual de-
struction by virtue of its removal, waives her moral rights to prevent the
commissioning government entity from removing her work from that
space. 255 In the site-specific waiver, Congress should include a clause
providing that, in addition to waving her rights to prevent conceptual
destruction, the artist also waives her rights to prevent the physical de-
struction, distortion, or mutilation of her crafted material that might re-
sult from its removal.
An exception to the waiver regarding the crafted work would apply
to distortion or mutilation that results from the owner relocating the
crafted material to another site. Removal and relocation of a site-specific
work does not only constitute destruction of the initial artwork, but is
also a distortion of the crafted work that was specifically created to relate
to the former site. Such distortion is not a direct result of removal. As in
§ 113(d), under the site-specific waiver provision, the artist would waive
her right to prevent distortion that is an inevitable result of removal.
However, since the owner can more readily prevent distortion that results
from relocation-by simply not displaying the crafted material at an al-
ternative site-the site-specific waiver would not require that the artist
relinquish her right to prevent such distortion.
The inclusion of a site-specific waiver is important to ensure the
alienability of public land. Balancing the interests at stake, the govern-
ment's interest in preserving alienability appears more significant than
the artist's interest in preventing the work's conceptual destruction.
However, the government's interest in displaying the artwork in an alter-
native location appears less significant than the artist's interest in
preventing the misrepresentation of her work, and the ensuing harm to
her reputation, as a result of the government placing her work before the
public in an unintended place. Accordingly, an artist should retain the
right to prevent distortion of her work by virtue of its relocation unless
she specifically waives that right in a written instrument that clearly al-
lows for the owner to relocate her work. She would not negotiate that
waiver under the site-specific provision, but, instead, under the waiver
clause in § 106A(e)(1)(a). 256
255 See id. § l 13(d)(1)(B).
256 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(l)(a). Section 106A(e)(l)(a) requires that the artist explicitly
state the uses of the work to which the waiver applies. That section states in relevant part:
The rights conferred by subsection (a) . . . may be waived if the author expressly
agrees to such waiver in a written instrument signed by the author. The instrument
shall specifically identify the work, and uses of that work, to which the waiver ap-
plies, and the waiver shall apply only to the work and uses so identified.
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In the event that removal of a work might not constitute actual de-
struction of the artists' crafted work, the site-specific waiver would also
require that the owner make a good faith effort to notify the artist of her
intentions before removing her work from the site.257 As in § 113(d)(2),
the owner would be able to remove the work without liability for subse-
quent physical damage to the crafted material, as long as the owner pro-
vides written notice of her intentions and the artist fails to remove, or pay
for removal, of the work within 90 days of receiving such notice. 258
While necessary to ensure alienability, a strict site-specific waiver
would not leave much hope for the artist because, although she could
potentially claim VARA protection to prevent removal, it is likely that
she would have bargained away those rights when securing the commis-
sion. Accordingly, as a sort of compromise, the site-specific waiver
clause must include a minimum display time provision requiring that the
government permit the commissioned work to remain in its location for
at least one year before removing it. That way, the government cannot
decide to remove the work after only a month, a week, or even a few
days, rendering the artist's hard work pointless. Since a government en-
tity generally has greater bargaining power when negotiating art commis-
sions, it is likely that an artist would have to waive her moral rights
under the site-specific provision to sustain a public commission. Thus,
unless the artist can successfully avoid having to sign a waiver provision,
VARA protection of site-specific art would prove meaningless-an
empty concession. A minimum display time requirement would mitigate
that risk by ensuring that the community has the opportunity to view the
work for a reasonable period of time.
The waiver clause for site-specific work protects both artists and
owners, and encourages the government commission of artwork. A
waiver clause for site-specific work would preclude an artist from bind-
ing public-owned land with her artwork by preventing an artist from
holding the government-owner liable if it decides to remove the work.
Without such a provision, VARA gives an artist the right to enjoin public
owners from removing site-specific artworks for the duration of the art-
ist's life, or to obtain damages from public owners upon completing a
removal. Thus, if a government entity commissions an artist to install a
work in a public space, it must commit itself to maintaining that work in
that space, despite the fact that public interest may dictate otherwise.
Assuming damages following removal, private individuals will be penal-
ized because the government entity will draw tax dollars from its trea-
sury to compensate the aggrieved artist. A waiver of VARA rights for
site-specific works would obviate this problem.
257 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(A).
258 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(B).
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Further, a waiver clause for site-specific work would encourage pa-
trons to commission art for public spaces, instead of discouraging them
because of fears that such art could potentially bind the land, or expose
them to liability. 259 These fears were the precise concern of those who
opposed VARA's enactment. 260 It was also a concern that convinced
many artists, art experts, scholars and attorneys that the § 113(d) waiver
provision was necessary to ensure that property owners continued to
commission artists to install works in their buildings. 261 By allaying
such fears, and thus encouraging commissions, a waiver clause for site-
specific work would promote the continued introduction of cultural and
aesthetic works into communities by governments. In turn, this would
give artists continued opportunities to express their ideas in a public fo-
rum. In sum, the process would encourage a viable art market.
CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, it
introduced a law wholly unlike any other law in the United States. While
the common law traditionally rejected doctrines that vindicated personal,
as opposed to economic, rights in artwork, VARA opened a channel for
artists to protect their personal moral rights in the works they create,
despite the fact that they may not own those works. In doing so, Con-
gress took important strides toward establishing that an artist's personal-
ity, spirit and reputation, which infuse her work, are not commodities
that can be assigned market values.
Nonetheless, granting commissioned artists of site-specific works
the moral rights of attribution and integrity does not come without its
own set of problems. Section 113(d) of the Copyright Act deals with the
problem of art binding the use of real estate by providing for a waiver of
moral rights when an artist agrees to install a work in a building. How-
ever, there is no similar provision regarding site-specific work installed
in public spaces.
Part of the overall problem with regard to site-specific artwork and
public property stems from the question of whether removing the site-
specific work from its context without destroying the installed object
constitutes a destruction contemplated by VARA. American and interna-
259 See WAIVER REPORT, supra note 75, at xvi. As the Register of Copyrights has noted:
[Installed works that are not structurally incorporated into a building, including site-
specific works, major commissioned works, and large government commissions]...
may not be covered by § 113(d), but ... waiver for these works is necessary to
protect buyer's investments and . . . absent waiver, buyers might be unwilling to
contract for creation of such works ...
Id.
260 See Moral Rights Hearings, supra note 76, at 19 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
261 See WAIVER REPORT, supra note 75, at 160.
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tional legal scholars, artists and art scholars, and the French courts, have
suggested that removal of such work from its context does indeed consti-
tute a destruction of the work. This demonstrates that the contemporary
understanding of site-specific artwork is that it is indivisibly composed
of both object and location. Because this should be the correct interpre-
tation of the nature of site-specific artwork, courts should read VARA to
give site-specific artists a right to prevent commissioning government
entities from removing site-specific works from their contexts. How-
ever, such a reading would, in effect, give artists a sort of control over
the use of public-owned space that Congress did not contemplate when it
enacted the statute.
To resolve this issue, VARA should provide for the limited waiver
of moral rights when site-specific artworks are publicly commissioned.
This waiver provision would serve two functions: (1) it would eliminate
the potential for artists to bind public-owned land for the durations of
their lives, regardless of the public's interest in removing the artist's
work; and (2) it would prevent discouraged patrons from declining to
commission such works which could, in turn, lead to substantial decline
in commercial opportunities for artists. In the meantime, until courts and
Congress address the complicated set of issues that arise under VARA
with respect to public-commissioned site-specific work, the legal and ar-
tistic controversy surrounding works like Silent City in Ithaca, New York
will continue to abound.
